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AF/E MARIA BEYZEROV; ANTANANARIVO FOR DATT

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [MP](#)

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S COURTESY CALL ON MAURITIAN PRIME  
MINISTER

Classified By: Ambassador Cesar B. Cabrera for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) On June 2, 2008, Ambassador Cabrera paid a courtesy call on Mauritian Prime Minister Ramgoolam; DCM served as notetaker. The relaxed and pleasant hour and a half discussion touched on a wide variety of topics, including U.S. elections, Kosovo, and Mauritian U.N. voting records. The two agreed to meet periodically to continue to update each other on issues of mutual interest.

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U.S. ELECTIONS  
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¶2. (SBU) Prime Minister Ramgoolam spent about a half hour discussing U.S. elections, particularly the primary process. He was interested in the Ambassador's thoughts on the process and Ramgoolam noted that he received an invitation to attend the Democratic Party Convention in August. Ramgoolam said he was considering going to the event, and was pleased by the Ambassador's offer to assist in arranging side-bar meetings. The Ambassador encouraged the PM to let the Embassy know his travel plans (and additional meeting requests) soonest, so Post could help support the trip, as needed.

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KOSOVO  
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¶3. (C) Ambassador took advantage of this courtesy call to ask for GOM to further consider formally recognizing Kosovo. The PM blamed the recently dismissed Foreign Minister for not being in favor of such recognition, but added that as PM he did not have all the details on the issue. The PM asked for an updated briefing paper to review their position on recognition of Kosovo. The PM seemed positively inclined toward recognition of Kosovo -- and was particularly receptive to the Ambassador's appeal that the Mauritian Muslim population, upon which the current coalition relies to remain in power, would perceive GOM recognition of Kosovo favorably.

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UN VOTING RECORD  
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¶4. (C) The Ambassador also raised the issue of the GOM's voting record in the UN, noting that it did not appear to accurately reflect the positive and friendly relationship shared between the United States and the GOM. The PM seemed genuinely surprised by the GOM's low percentage of 2007 votes with the US (only 6 votes with the US, and 65 votes in disagreement), and asked for a vote-by-vote readout. Post will follow-up with the PM's office in the coming week.

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ZIMBABWE

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15. (C) Noting that our highest rate of agreement in UN votes was in the realm of Human Rights, the Ambassador turned the conversation to Zimbabwe. The PM opined that leader of the opposition, Morgan Tsvangirai, would win the upcoming election. He added that previous comments by Tsvangirai regarding not running had been alarming, as the PM believed allowing Mugabe to run unopposed would be a disaster. In the last elections, Mauritius sent only the head of the electoral commission as an observer. According to the PM, Mauritius will send a "much larger" delegation for the upcoming run-offs.

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MILITARY ISSUES  
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16. (C) During the meeting, the PM agreed in principal to consider a Status of Forces Agreement, noting the positives both countries enjoy during ship visits to Mauritius. The Ambassador discussed the variety of military and security assistance programs, highlighting recent projects including the crisis management training, peacekeeping training, and assistance to the GOM reaction procedures and infrastructure for natural disasters (specifically flooding and tsunamis). The PM asked for additional police training, particularly vis-a-vis criminal investigation. The PM is looking for international assistance to ensure better police procedures which result in more criminal convictions. Post will explore this request further with appropriate USG counterparts.

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COMMENT  
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17. (C) Since the dismissal of the Foreign Minister, the PM has taken on the Foreign Minister role. This has caused a good deal of confusion within the MFA, as offices grapple with waiting for PM response to matters that were previously decided by the FM. Ramgoolam noted that he is generally unhappy with the performance of the MFA, and planned "comprehensive changes" in the coming months. These changes would take place, he said, before he assigned another person as Foreign Affairs Minister. Ramgoolam is often criticized in the press and by Embassy contacts for his inability to delegate authority. Post has observed the PM's tendency toward micro-management and the negative impact it can have on actively following through on foreign affairs issues. During the meeting with the Ambassador, the PM specifically asked for any and all follow-up to take place between the DCM and the head of the PM's office and that the DCM not/not take any of the at-play issues to the MFA. The PM noted this was to "ensure they are fast tracked" and that he is briefed; he added that many foreign affairs issues and briefs never make it to him as Prime Minister.

CABRERA